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Abstract
The Great Recession and worldwide ﬁnancial crisis have exploded ﬁscal imbal-
ances and brought ﬁscal policy and inﬂation to the forefront of policy concerns. Those
concerns will only grow as aging populations increase demands on government expen-
ditures in coming decades. It is widely perceived that ﬁscal policy is inﬂationary if
and only if it leads the central bank to print new currency to monetize deﬁcits. Mon-
etization can be inﬂationary. But it is a misperception that this is the only channel
for ﬁscal inﬂations. Nominal bonds, the predominant form of government debt in ad-
vanced economies, derive their value from expected future nominal primary surpluses
and money creation; changes in the price level can align the market value of debt to
its expected real backing. This introduces a fresh channel, not requiring explicit mon-
etization, through which ﬁscal deﬁcits directly aﬀect inﬂation. The paper describes
various ways in which ﬁscal policy can directly aﬀect inﬂation and explains why these
ﬁscal eﬀects are diﬃcult to detect in time series data.
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Figure 1: In percent of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund (2011)
1 Introduction
Not so long ago, macroeconomists interested in understanding inﬂation and its determinants
were comfortable sweeping ﬁscal policy under the carpet, implicitly assuming that the ﬁscal
adjustments required to allow monetary policy to control inﬂation would always be forthcom-
ing. This sanguine view is reﬂected in recent graduate textbooks, which make scant mention
of ﬁscal policy, and in the economic models at central banks, which all but ignore ﬁscal
phenomena. It is also reﬂected in the widespread adoption of inﬂation targeting by central
banks, but the nearly complete absence of the adoption of compatible ﬁscal frameworks.
The Great Recession and accompanying worldwide ﬁnancial crisis have brought an abrupt
halt to researchers’ benign neglect of ﬁscal policy. Figure 1 underlies the sudden shift in at-
titude among economists and policy makers alike. Fiscal deﬁcits worldwide, but particularly
in advanced economies, shot up and public debt as a share of GDP ballooned to nearly
100 percent in advanced economies. As central banks lowered nominal interest rates toward
their zero bound, they moved to quantitative actions that dramatically expanded the size
and riskiness of their balance sheets. Europe’s monetary union has been stressed, perhaps to
the breaking point, by member nations’ ﬁscal woes. With both ﬁscal and monetary author-
ities taking ﬁscal actions, professional and policy focuses have now shifted to ﬁscal matters
and the interactions of monetary and ﬁscal policies.
With the shift in focus has come enhanced interest in the potential channels through
which ﬁscal policy can aﬀect aggregate demand and inﬂation. And, in light of the facts in
ﬁgure 1, a pressing question is, “Do proﬂigate ﬁscal policies threaten the progress many coun-
tries have made toward achieving low and stable inﬂation?” In the conventional monetary
paradigm that underlies central bank models and, we conjecture, the thinking of central
bankers, the answer is, “No, so long as the central bank steadfastly refuses to print new
currency to ﬁnance deﬁcits.”
This paradigm maintains that there is no mechanism by which ﬁscal policy can be inﬂa-
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tionary that is independent of monetary policy and money creation. Sargent and Wallace
(1981) model this conventional view and dub it “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.” In their
setup, ﬁscal policy runs a chronic primary deﬁcit—spending exclusive of debt service less tax
revenues—that is independent of inﬂation and government debt and a simple quantity theory
demand for money holds, so the price level adjusts to establish money market equilibrium.
The economy faces a ﬁscal limit because the private sector’s demand for bonds imposes an
upper bound on the debt-GDP ratio. Sargent and Wallace’s government bonds are real:
claims to payoﬀs denominated in units of goods.
If primary deﬁcits are exogenous—one notion of “proﬂigate” ﬁscal policy—and the ex-
ogeneity is immutable, then monetary policy loses its ability to control inﬂation. Standard
reasoning underlies the result. If monetary policy initially aims to control inﬂation by setting
money growth independently of ﬁscal policy, then eventually the exogenous deﬁcit will drive
debt to the ﬁscal limit. At the limit, if government is to remain solvent, monetary policy
has no alternative but to print money to generate the seigniorage revenues needed to meet
interest payments in the debt.1 Eventually, money growth must rise and, by the quantity
theory, so must inﬂation. Long-run monetary policy is driven by the need to stabilize debt
and the inﬂation rate is determined by the size of the total ﬁscal deﬁcit, including interest
payments.
This conventional paradigm reﬂects common perceptions of ﬁscal inﬂations. But it is
a misperception to believe that ﬁscal policy can aﬀect inﬂation only if monetary policy
monetizes deﬁcits in the manner that Sargent and Wallace envision.
The tight connection between seigniorage ﬁnancing and inﬂation in Sargent and Wallace’s
model stems from the assumption that bonds are real, or perfectly indexed to the price level.
Higher real debt requires the government to raise more real resources—like seigniorage—to
fully back the debt. But in practice only a small fraction of government debt issued by
advanced economies is indexed. Even in the United Kingdom, which has a thick market for
indexed government bonds, about 80 percent of outstanding debt is nominal. Ninety percent
of U.S. treasuries are nominal and fractions are still higher elsewhere.
Recognizing that bonds are denominated in nominal terms introduces a direct channel
from ﬁscal policy to inﬂation. Called the ﬁscal theory of the price level, this channel does not
rely on “monetizing deﬁcits” or on insuﬃcient inﬂation-ﬁghting resolve by the central bank.2
Instead, it springs from the fact that a nominal bond is a claim to a nominal payoﬀ—dollars,
euros, or shekels—and that the real value of the payoﬀ depends on the price level.
Higher nominal debt may be fully backed by real resources—real primary surpluses and
seigniorage—or it may be backed only by nominal cash ﬂows. When real resources fully
back the debt, the conventional paradigm prevails and ﬁscal policy is inﬂationary only if
the central bank monetizes deﬁcits. But when the government cannot or will not raise the
necessary real backing, the ﬁscal theory creates a direct link between current and expected
deﬁcits and inﬂation.3
1We are assuming that in the long run the economy’s growth rate is below the real interest rate on debt.
2Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), and Cochrane (1998) describe the ﬁscal theory and its
implications.
3The terms “ﬁscal theory” and “quantity theory” are unfortunate because they suggest that these are
distinct models of price-level determination. As we show, the price level and inﬂation always depend on
both monetary and ﬁscal policy behavior. The ﬁscal and quantity “theories” emerge under alternative
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Even though the data in ﬁgure 1 have sent some policy makers and ﬁnancial markets
into apoplexy, they are but the tip of the ﬁscal stress iceberg. Table 1 describes the real
problem. Aging populations and promised government old-age beneﬁts that far outstrip
revenue provisions imply massive “unfunded liabilities.” Plans to bring current deﬁcits
under control do little to address the coming ﬁscal stress. We have no special insights
into the political solutions to this unprecedented ﬁscal problem, but we can shed light on
the economic consequences—particularly for inﬂation—of alternative private-sector beliefs
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Table 1: Net present value of impact on ﬁscal deﬁcit of aging-related spending, in percent
of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund (2009).
We work from the premise that central bankers have learned the unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic lesson, so explicit monetization of deﬁcits is oﬀ the table in advanced economies.
though this is not a universally held view [Cochrane (2011b)]. For the most part, we also
exclude outright default on the government liabilities of those countries. On-going develop-
ments in the euro area vividly illustrate the lengths to which policy makers will go to avoid
default, and policy makers in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere hold
similar views.
There remain two possible resolutions to ﬁscal stress. First, government could success-
fully persuade the public that future revenue and spending adjustments will occur. With
ﬁscal policy taking care of itself, we return to the sanguine world in which central banks
retain control of inﬂation. Numbers in table 1 underscore how large those adjustments must
be. Economic theory tells us that those policies must also be credible to ﬁrmly anchor ex-
pectations on the necessary ﬁscal adjustments, which is what is required for monetary policy
to retain control of inﬂation as in the conventional paradigm.
Because the ﬁrst resolution is well understood, the paper focuses on a variety of alterna-
tive policy scenarios in which aspects of the second resolution—price-level changes induced
by the ﬁscal theory—come into play. We focus on the ﬁscal theory because it seems to be
monetary-ﬁscal regimes, as Gordon and Leeper (2006) show.
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poorly understood and quickly discarded by central bankers. For example, in their discus-
sion of the implications of ﬁscal stress for central banks, Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli
(2010, footnote 23) acknowledge the ﬁscal theory, but immediately dismiss it as “untested
and controversial.” As we point out below, the ﬁscal theory is no more or less “testable”
than the quantity theory or its recent oﬀspring, the new Keynesian/Taylor rule model of
inﬂation. And it is “controversial,” we believe, because it is relatively new, its implications
are unsettling, and its economic mechanisms have not yet been fully absorbed by monetary
economists and policy makers.
1.1 What We Do Section 2 uses a simple model to illustrate how the price level is
determined in the conventional paradigm and in the ﬁscal theory. The conventional policy
mix—Regime M—has monetary policy target inﬂation and ﬁscal policy stabilize the value of
debt. An alternative mix—Regime F—is available when governments issue nominal bonds.
That mix assigns monetary policy to stabilize debt and ﬁscal policy to control the price level,
giving rise to the ﬁscal theory equilibrium.
In Regime M, deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cuts or spending increases do not aﬀect aggregate
demand because the private sector expects the resulting increase in government debt to be
exactly matched by future tax increases or spending reductions. Expansions in government
debt do not raise wealth. This ﬁscal behavior relieves monetary policy of debt stabilization,
freeing the central bank to target inﬂation.
Regime F posits diﬀerent policies that align closely to actual behavior in many countries
recently. Suppose that higher deﬁcits do not create higher expected surpluses and that
central banks either peg short-term nominal interest rates or raise them only weakly with
inﬂation. Because a tax cut today does not portend future tax hikes, individuals initially
perceive the increase in nominal debt to be an increase in their real wealth. They try to
convert higher wealth into consumption goods, raising aggregate demand. Rising demand
brings with it rising prices, which continue to rise until real wealth falls back to its pre-tax-
cut level and individuals are content with their original consumption plans. By preventing
nominal interest rates from rising sharply with inﬂation, monetary policy prevents debt
service from growing too rapidly, which stabilizes the value of government bonds. In this
stylized version of the ﬁscal theory, monetary policy can anchor expected inﬂation on the
inﬂation target, but ﬁscal policy determines actual inﬂation.
The section goes on to describe how the maturity structure of nominal government bonds
can alter the time series properties of inﬂation and it lays out the precise role that monetary
policy plays in a ﬁscal equilibrium. A ﬁscal theory equilibrium is consistent with a wide
range of patterns of correlation in data, including a positive correlation between inﬂation
and money growth, a negative correlation between inﬂation and the debt-GDP ratio, and
any correlation between inﬂation and nominal debt growth and deﬁcits.
Having established that under Regime F policies monetary policy does not control inﬂa-
tion, section 3 turns to plausible scenarios in which the central bank does not control inﬂation
even in Regime M. One example arises when the public believes the economy may hit its
ﬁscal limit, the point at which taxes and spending can no longer adjust to stabilize debt, at
some point in the future. Even if monetary policy aggressively targets inﬂation in the years
before the limit, it cannot determine the inﬂation rate and it cannot even anchor expected
inﬂation. A second type of ﬁscal limit stems from the risk of sovereign default. When the
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central bank sets the interest rate on short-term government bonds, a higher probability of
default feeds directly into current inﬂation. Finally, in a monetary union, the member nation
whose ﬁscal policies are proﬂigate will determine the union-wide price level, even if other
member countries run ﬁscal policies that consistently target real debt.
In section 4 the paper turns to consider the empirical implications of monetary-ﬁscal
policy interactions. That section lays out some observational equivalence results that arise
in models of section 2. Restrictions on policy behavior and/or exogenous driving processes
are crucial in discerning whether observed time series on inﬂation, debt, and deﬁcits are
generated by a Regime M or a Regime F equilibrium.
Central bankers who aim to hit an inﬂation target, need to know whether the economy
resides in Regime M or in Regime F. Observational equivalence informs us that existing
research may not be able to address this fundamental issue without ﬁrst confronting the
observational equivalence problem. Until we tackle this formidable empirical challenge, we
cannot use data to distinguish perceptions from misperceptions about ﬁscal inﬂation.
The paper leaves many important topics unexplored. For analytical clarity, we consider
only endowment economies with ﬂexible prices. Kim (2003), Woodford (1998b), Cochrane
(2011a), and Sims (2011) study the ﬁscal theory in sticky-price models. We also do not
explore the diﬀerences among debt devaluations arising from price-level changes, outright
default, and debt dilution—all issues that are particularly timely now. Untouched by our pa-
per are the game-theoretic aspects of monetary-ﬁscal interactions that Dixit and Lambertini
(2001, 2003a,b) and Bassetto (2002) study.
2 Simple Model of Monetary-Fiscal Interactions
We present a simple analytical model of price-level and inﬂation determination that is de-
signed to illustrate the role that the interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policies play in
the inﬂation process. Throughout the analysis we restrict attention to rational expectations
equilibria, so the results can be readily contrasted to prevailing views, which also are based
on rational expectations.
The model draws from Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), and Woodford (2001) to lay the
groundwork for how monetary and ﬁscal policies jointly determine equilibrium. These results
are well known, but the broader implications of thinking about macro policies jointly are
not fully appreciated.
An inﬁnitely lived representative household is endowed each period with a constant quan-
tity of non-storable goods, y. To keep the focus away from seigniorage considerations, we
initially examine a cashless economy, which can be obtained by making the role of ﬁat
currency inﬁnitesimally small. (The next section brings money back into the picture.) Gov-
ernment issues nominal one-period bonds, allowing us to deﬁne the price level, P, as the rate
at which bonds exchange for goods.





tu(ct), 0 <β<1( 1 )
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taking prices and R−1B−1 > 0 as given. The household pays taxes, τt, and receives transfers,
zt, each period, both of which are lump sum.
Government spending is zero each period, so the government chooses sequences of taxes,
transfers, and debt to satisfy its ﬂow constraint
Bt
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given R−1B−1 > 0, while the monetary authority chooses a sequence for the nominal interest
rate.
After imposing goods market clearing, ct = y for t ≥ 0, the household’s consumption









The exogenous (ﬁxed) gross real interest rate, 1/β, makes the analysis easier but is not
without some lose of generality, as Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010) show in the context
of ﬁscal ﬁnancing in a model with nominal rigidities. This is less the case in a small open
economy, so one interpretation of this model is that it is a small open economy in which
government debt is denominated in terms of the home nominal bonds (“currency”) and all
debt is held by domestic agents.
The focus on price-level determination is entirely for analytical convenience; it is not a
statement that inﬂation is the only thing that macro policy authorities do or should care
about. Because price-level determination is the ﬁrst step toward understanding how macro
policies aﬀect the aggregate economy, the key insights derived from this model extend to
more complex environments.
Price-level determination depends on monetary-ﬁscal policy behavior. At a general level,
macroeconomic policies have two tasks to perform: control inﬂation and stabilize government
debt. Monetary and ﬁscal policy are perfectly symmetric with regard to the two tasks and
two diﬀerent policy mixes can accomplish the tasks. The conventional assignment of tasks—
Regime M—instructs monetary policy to target inﬂation and ﬁscal policy to target real debt
(or the debt-GDP ratio). But an alternative assignment—Regime F—also works: monetary
policy is tasked with maintaining the value of debt and ﬁscal policy is assigned to control
inﬂation. We now describe these two regimes in detail.
2.1 Regime M: Active Monetary/Passive Tax Policy This policy regime reproduces well-
known results about how inﬂation is determined in the canonical model of monetary policy,
as presented in textbooks by Woodford (2003) and Gal´ ı (2008), for example. This regime—
denoted active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy—combines an interest rate rule in which
the central bank aggressively adjusts the nominal rate in response to current inﬂation with a
tax rule in which the tax authority adjusts taxes in response to government debt suﬃciently
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to stabilize debt.4 In this textbook world, monetary policy can consistently hit its inﬂation
target and ﬁscal policy can achieve its target for the real value of debt.
To derive the equilibrium price level for the model laid out above, we need to specify rules
for monetary, tax, and transfers policies. Monetary policy follows a conventional interest rate
rule, which for analytical convenience, is written somewhat unconventionally in terms of the












,α > 1/β (5)
where π∗ is the inﬂation target and R∗ = π∗/β is the steady state nominal interest rate. The
condition on the policy parameter α ensures that monetary policy is suﬃciently hawkish in
response to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation that it can stabilize inﬂation around π∗.









,γ > r =1 /β − 1( 6 )
where b∗ is the real debt (or debt-GDP) target, τ∗ is the steady state level of taxes, and
r =1 /β − 1 is the net real interest rate. Imposing that γ exceeds the net real interest rate
guarantees that any increase in government debt creates an expectation that future taxes
will rise by enough to both service the higher debt and retire it back to b∗.
Government transfers evolve exogenously according to the stochastic process
zt =( 1− ρ)z
∗ + ρzt−1 + εt, 0 <ρ<1( 7 )
where z∗ is steady-state transfers and εt is a serially uncorrelated shock with Etεt+1 =0 .

















Aggressive reactions of monetary policy to inﬂation imply that β/α < 1 and the unique
bounded solution for inﬂation is
πt = π
∗ (9)
so equilibrium inﬂation is always on target, as is expected inﬂation.5,6
4Applying Leeper’s (1991) deﬁnitions, “active” monetary policy targets inﬂation, while “passive” mone-
tary policy weakly adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to inﬂation; “active” tax policy sets taxes
independently of government debt and “passive” tax policy changes rates strongly enough when debt rises
to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio. Or ﬁscal policy could be associated with setting transfers instead of taxes.
5As Sims (1999) and Cochrane (2011a) emphasize, echoing Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983), there is a contin-
uum of explosive solutions to (8), each one associated with the central bank threatening to drive inﬂation
to inﬁnity if the private sector’s expectations are not anchored on π∗. Cochrane uses this logic to argue
that fundamentally only ﬁscal policy can uniquely determine inﬂation and the price level. Sims argues, in a
monetary model that supports a barter equilibrium, that only a ﬁscal commitment to a ﬂoor value of real
money balances can deliver a unique equilibrium. Determinacy comes from the ﬁscal authority committing
to switch from a passive stance if the price level gets too high to adopt a policy that redeems government
liabilities at a ﬁxed ﬂoor real value. If the ﬁscal commitment is believed, in equilibrium, this ﬁscal “backstop”
will never need to be used and only stable price-level paths will be realized. Both Cochrane and Sims argue
that there is nothing monetary policy alone can do to eliminate the explosive price-level paths.
6Although there is a unique bounded inﬂation process, this regime does not pin down the price-level
process.
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If monetary policy determines inﬂation, how must ﬁscal policy respond to disturbances
in transfers to ensure that policy is sustainable? This is where passive tax adjustments
step in. Substituting the tax rule, (6), into the government’s budget constraint, (3), taking
expectations conditional on information at t − 1, and employing the Fisher relation, (4),


















Because β−1 −γ<1, debt that is above target brings forth the expectation of higher taxes,
so (10) describes how debt is expected to return to steady state following a shock to zt.I n
a steady state in which εt ≡ 0, debt is b∗ =( τ∗ − z∗)/(β−1 − 1), equal to the present value
of primary surpluses.
Another perspective on the ﬁscal ﬁnancing requirements when monetary policy is tar-
geting inﬂation emerges from a ubiquitous equilibrium condition. In any dynamic model
with rational agents, government debt derives its value from its anticipated backing. In this
model, that anticipated backing comes from tax revenues net of transfer payments, τt − zt.
The value of government debt can be obtained by imposing equilibrium on the government’s







j(τt+j − zt+j) (11)
This intertemporal equilibrium condition provides a new perspective on passive tax policy.
Because Pt is nailed down by monetary policy and {zt+j}∞
j=1 is being set independently of
both monetary and tax policies, any increase in transfers at t, which is ﬁnanced by new sales
of nominal Bt, must generate an expectation that taxes will rise in the future by exactly
enough to support the higher value of real Bt/Pt.
In this model, the only potential source of an expansion in debt is disturbances to trans-
fers. But passive tax policy implies that this pattern of ﬁscal adjustment must occur re-
gardless of the reason that Bt increases: economic downturns that automatically reduce
taxes and raise transfers, changes in household portfolio behavior, changes in government
spending, or central bank open-market operations. To expand on the last example, we could
modify this model to include money to allow us to imagine that the central bank decides
to tighten monetary policy exogenously at t by conducting an open-market sale of bonds.
If monetary policy is active, then the monetary contraction both raises Bt—bonds held by
households—and it lowers Pt; real debt rises from both eﬀects. This can be an equilibrium
only if ﬁscal policy is expected to support it by passively raising future real tax revenues.
That is, given active monetary policy, (11) imposes restrictions on the class of tax poli-
cies that is consistent with equilibrium; those policies are labeled “passive” because the tax
authority has limited discretion in choosing policy. Refusal by tax policy to adjust appropri-
ately undermines the ability of open-market operations to aﬀect inﬂation in the conventional
manner, just as Wallace (1981) illustrates.
A policy regime in which monetary policy is active and tax policy is passive produces
the conventional outcome that inﬂation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon
and a hawkish central bank can successfully anchor actual and expected inﬂation at the
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inﬂation target. Tax policy must support the active monetary behavior by passively adjusting
taxes to ﬁnance disturbances to government debt—from whatever source, including monetary
policy—and ensure policy is sustainable.
Although conventional, this regime is not the only mechanism by which monetary and
ﬁscal policy can jointly deliver a unique bounded equilibrium. We turn now to the other
polar case.
2.2 Regime F: Passive Monetary/Active Tax Policy Passive tax behavior is a stringent
requirement: the tax authority must be willing and able to raise taxes in the face of rising
government debt. For a variety of reasons, this does not always happen, and it certainly does
not happen in the automated way prescribed by the tax rule in (6). Political factors may
prevent taxes from rising as needed to stabilize debt, as in the United States today.7 Some
countries simply do not have the ﬁscal infrastructure in place to generate the necessary tax
revenues. Others might be at or near the peak of their Laﬀer curves, suggesting they are
close to the ﬁscal limit.8 In this case, tax policy is active and 0 ≤ γ<1/β − 1.
Analogously, there are also periods when the concerns of monetary policy move away from
inﬂation stabilization and toward other matters, such as output stabilization or ﬁnancial
crises. These are periods in which monetary policy is no longer active, instead adjusting
the nominal interest rate only weakly in response to inﬂation. Woodford (2001) cites the
Federal Reserve’s bond-price pegging policy during and immediately after World War II as
an example of passive monetary policy. Bordo and Hautcoeur (2007) point out that the
Banque de France pegged nominal bond prices in the 1920s at the same time that political
gridlock prevented the ﬁscal adjustments necessary to stabilize debt. Inﬂation rose and the
franc depreciated during this mix of passive monetary and active ﬁscal policies. The recent
global recession and ﬁnancial crisis is a striking case where central banks’ concerns shifted
away from inﬂation. In some countries the policy rate was reduced to its zero lower bound.
Then monetary policy is passive and, in terms of policy rule (5), 0 ≤ α<1/β.
We focus on a particular policy mix that yields clean economic interpretations: the
nominal interest rate is set independently of inﬂation, α =0a n dR
−1
t = R∗−1 ≥ 1, and taxes
are set independently of debt, γ =0a n dτt = τ∗ > 0. These policy speciﬁcations might seem
extreme and special, but the qualitative points that emerge generalize to other speciﬁcations
of passive monetary/active tax policies.
One result pops out immediately. Applying the pegged nominal interest rate policy to











so expected inﬂation is anchored on the inﬂation target, an outcome that is perfectly consis-
tent with one aim of inﬂation-targeting central banks. It turns out, however, that another
7Davig and Leeper (2006, 2011) generalize (6) to estimate Markov switching rules for the United States
and ﬁnd that tax policy has switched between periods when taxes rise with debt and periods when they do
not.
8Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) characterize Laﬀer curves for capital and labor taxes in 14 EU countries and
the United States to ﬁnd that some countries—Denmark and Sweden—are on the wrong side of the curve,
suggesting that those countries must lower tax rates to raise revenues.
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aim of inﬂation targeters—stabilization of actual inﬂation—which can be achieved by active
monetary/passive ﬁscal policy, is no longer attainable.
























At time t, the numerator of this expression is predetermined, representing the nominal value
of household wealth carried into period t. The denominator is the expected present value of
primary ﬁscal surpluses from date t on, which is exogenous. So long as R∗Bt−1 > 0a n dt h e
present value of revenues exceeds the present value of transfers, a condition that must hold if
government debt has positive value, expression (14) delivers a unique Pt > 0. In contrast to
the active monetary/passive ﬁscal regime, this policy mix uniquely determines both inﬂation
and the price level.
We have done nothing mystical here, despite what some critics claim [for example, Buiter
(2002) or McCallum (2001)]. In particular, the government is not assumed to behave in a
manner that violates its budget constraint. Unlike competitive households, the government
is not required to choose sequences of control variables that are consist with its budget
constraint for all possible price sequences. Indeed, for a central bank to target inﬂation,
it cannot be choosing its policy instrument to be consistent with any sequence of the price
level; doing so would produce an indeterminate equilibrium. Identical reasoning applies to
the ﬁscal authority: the value of a dollar of debt—1/Pt—depends on expectations about
ﬁscal decisions in the future; expectations, in turn, are determined by the tax rule the ﬁscal
authority announces. The ﬁscal authority credibly commits to its tax rule and, given the
process for transfers, this determines the backing of government debt and, therefore, its
market value.
Using the solution for the price level in (14) to compute expected inﬂation, it is straight-
forward to show that βEt(Pt/Pt+1)=1 /R∗, as required by the Fisher relation and monetary
policy behavior.9 This observation leads to a sharp dichotomy between the roles of monetary
and ﬁscal policy in price-level determination: monetary policy alone appears to determine
expected inﬂation by choosing the level at which to peg the nominal interest rate, R∗, while
conditional on that choice, ﬁscal variables appear to determine realized inﬂation. Monetary
policy’s ability to target expected inﬂation holds in this simple model with a ﬁxed policy
regime; as we show in section 3, when regime change is possible, monetary policy may not
be able to control even expected inﬂation.













To ﬁnd expected inﬂation, simply use the date t − 1 version of (14)f o rPt−1 and simplify to obtain
βEt−1(Pt−1/Pt)=1 /Rt−1 =1 /R∗.
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To understand the nature of this equilibrium, we need to delve into the underlying eco-
nomic behavior. This is an environment in which changes in debt do not elicit any changes
in expected taxes, unlike in section 2.1. First consider a one-oﬀ increase in current transfer
payments, zt, ﬁnanced by new nominal debt issuance, Bt. With no oﬀsetting increase in
current or expected tax obligations, at initial prices households feel wealthier and they try
to shift up their consumption paths. Higher demand for goods drives up the price level and
continues to do so until the wealth eﬀect dissipates and households are content with their
initial consumption plan. This is why in expression (13) the value of debt at t changes with
expected, but not current, transfers. Now imagine that at time t households receive news of
higher transfers in the future. In the ﬁrst instance, there is no change in nominal debt at t,
but there is still an increase in household wealth. Through the same mechanism, Pt must
rise to revalue current debt to be consistent with the new expected path of transfers: the
value of debt falls in line with the lower expected present value of surpluses.
Cochrane (2009, p. 5) oﬀers another interpretation of the equilibrium in which “‘aggre-
gate demand’ is really just the mirror image of demand for government debt.” An expectation
that transfers will rise in the future reduces the household’s assessment of the value of gov-
ernment debt. Households can shed debt only by converting it into demand for consumption
goods, hence the increase in aggregate demand that translates into a higher price level.
Expression (14) highlights that in this policy regime the impacts of monetary policy
change dramatically. When the central bank chooses a higher rate at which to peg the
nominal interest rate, the eﬀect is to raise the inﬂation rate next period. This echoes
Sargent and Wallace (1981), but the economic mechanism is diﬀerent. In the current policy
mix, a higher nominal interest rate raises the interest payments the household receives on
the government bonds it holds. Higher R∗Bt−1, with no higher anticipated taxes raises
household nominal wealth at the beginning of t, triggering the same adjustments as above.
In this sense, as in Sargent and Wallace, monetary policy has lost control of inﬂation.
This section has reviewed existing results on price-level determination under alternative
monetary-ﬁscal policy regimes. In each regime a bounded inﬂation rate is uniquely deter-
mined, but the impacts of changes in policy diﬀer markedly across the two regimes. We now
turn to elaborate on a key diﬀerence between the ﬁscal theory and unpleasant arithmetic.
2.3 Why the Fiscal Theory is Not Unpleasant Arithmetic It is not uncommon
for policy makers to equate ﬁscal inﬂations to the mechanism that Sargent and Wallace
(1981) highlighted and then to dismiss its relevance. As King (1995, p. 171–172) wrote
about unpleasant arithmetic:
“I have never found this proposition very convincing....[A]s an empirical mat-
ter, the proposition is of little current relevance to the major industrial countries.
This is for two reasons. First, seigniorage—ﬁnancing the deﬁcit by issuing cur-
rency rather than bonds—is very small relative to other sources of revenues.
Second, over the past decade or so, governments have become increasingly com-
mitted to price stability....This sea change in the conventional wisdom about
price stability leaves no room for inﬂation to bail out ﬁscal policy.”
Later in the same commentary, King [p. 173] acknowledges that “...periodic episodes of
unexpected inﬂation...have reduced debt-to-GDP ratios.” This observ ation is consistent
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with the ﬁscal theory, though King does not attribute the inﬂation to ﬁscal news.
A ﬁscal theory equilibrium can be consistent with any average rate of inﬂation and
money creation. This point emerges clearly in Leeper’s (1991) local analysis around a given
deterministic steady state: on average inﬂation could be zero, yet monetary and ﬁscal shocks
generate all the results shown in section 2.2. In the model above, the unconditional mean of
inﬂation is π∗, the inﬂation target, and in a monetary version of the model, π∗ is determined
by average money growth (or seigniorage revenues).
A key diﬀerence between the ﬁscal theory and unpleasant arithmetic is that the former
operates only in an economy with nominal government debt, whereas the latter is typically
discussed under the assumption of real debt. Without a fully ﬂeshed-out model, the dis-
tinction between nominal and real debt can be understood by examining the corresponding
intertemporal equilibrium conditions—the analogs to (13). We add ﬁat currency to make a
























Both conditions involve the expected present value of primary surpluses plus seigniorage.
The ﬁscal theory is about how changes in this expected present value lead to changes in
Pt. Unpleasant arithmetic is about how increases in vt−1 induce increases in expected future
seigniorage, (Mt+j − Mt+j−1)/Pt.
To understand the diﬀerences, consider a hypothetical increase in Pt, holding all else
ﬁxed. In (15), higher Pt raises the nominal backing to debt, so it implies higher cash ﬂows in
the form of nominal primary surpluses: more nominal debt can be supported with no change
in real surpluses or seigniorage. In (16), higher Pt lowers the real backing to debt because it
reduces seigniorage revenues and real cash ﬂows.
This makes clear why the ﬁscal theory is not about seigniorage: even if real balances are
arbitrarily small or the economy is on the wrong side of the seigniorage Laﬀer curve, under
the ﬁscal theory, higher Pt increases the backing of debt by raising the nominal cash ﬂows
associated with primary surpluses. In this case, as (16) shows, higher Pt does nothing to
aﬀect the backing of real debt.
2.4 Regime F: Two-Period Government Debt Restricting attention to one-period
debt makes it seem that ﬁscal news must generate jumps in the current price level. This
need not happen. To get a richer sense of inﬂation dynamics in the passive monetary/active
ﬁscal regime, suppose that the government issues nominal bonds with a maximum maturity
of two periods. Let Bt(j) denote the face value of zero-coupon nominal bonds outstanding
at the end of period t, which mature in period j and let Qt(j) be the corresponding nominal
price for those bonds. At the beginning of period t, the nominal returns, Rt(t +1 )a n d
Rt(t + 2), are known with certainty and are risk free. Clearly, Rt(t +1 ) −1 = Qt(t +1 ) ,
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Rt(t +2 ) −1 = Qt(t +2 ) ,Qt(t)=1a n dBt(j)=0f o rj ≤ t. To economize on notation, we
assume that each period the government retires outstanding debt and issues new one- and
two-period bonds.
The government’s ﬂow budget constraint is
Qt(t +1 ) Bt(t +1 )
Pt
+






Qt(t +1 ) Bt−1(t +1 )
Pt
(17)
where xt is the primary surplus inclusive of seigniorage revenues, deﬁned as




where Mt is the nominal quantity of ﬁat money outstanding.








In a frictionless economy with a constant real interest rate, the household’s Euler equation





















Take expectations of the government budget constraint, impose the asset-pricing relations
and the transversality condition, which requires the expected present value of the market
value of debt to be zero, to obtain the intertemporal equilibrium condition







Combining (24) with the government’s ﬂow constraint, (17), yields







10This speciﬁcation may be obtained from a cash-in-advance model or from money-in-utility/transactions-
cost models in which the interest elasticity is driven to the zero limit.
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T h el e f ts i d eo f( 25) is the market value of debt outstanding at the beginning of period t.T w o
terms in this value—the face value of outstanding nominal bonds, Bt−1(t)a n dBt−1(t+1)—
are carried into period t from period t − 1, so they are predetermined at t.B u tt w oo t h e r
terms—the price of two-period bonds issued at t − 1a n ds o l da tt, Qt(t + 1), and the price
level, Pt—are determined at period t and respond to shocks and news that arrive at t.
Using equilibrium relationship (21)i n( 25) makes clear the tradeoﬀs that monetary policy
faces when primary surpluses are ﬁxed
Bt−1(t)
Pt








Monetary policy faces two limiting cases. It can lean strongly against current inﬂation to
ﬁx Pt, but then it must permit future inﬂation, Et(1/Pt+1), to adjust. Alternatively, it can
stabilize expected inﬂation at t+1, but then it must allow Pt to adjust. The tradeoﬀ between
current and future inﬂation depends on the ratio Bt−1(t+1) /Bt−1(t), the ratio between the
outstanding quantities of two-period to one-period bonds, a role for the maturity structure
of government debt that Cochrane (2001) emphasizes. As debt becomes of increasingly short
maturity, this ratio falls and a larger change in expected inﬂation is required to compensate
for a given change in current inﬂation.
2.4.1 Fiscal Expansions and Inflation We employ the two equilibrium conditions,
(20)a n d( 26), to derive the implications for inﬂation of alternative policy environments.
Monetary policy controls the one-period nominal bond price, Qt(t + 1), which is equivalent
to controlling the short-term nominal interest rate, Rt =1 /Qt(t +1 ) .
For this exposition, we make the simplifying assumption that the primary surplus, {τt −
zt} is exogenous or at least independent of the price level and the value of outstanding
government debt. This may seem like an extreme and implausible assumption in light
of Hall and Sargent’s (2011) accounting that since World War II, adjustments in primary
surpluses have been an important determinant of U.S. debt-GDP dynamics. Of course, Hall
and Sargent’s is an accounting exercise that does not aim to establish that ﬂuctuations
in government debt caused subsequent surplus adjustments that were designed to stabilize
debt.11 But even if we make the bold assumption of causality, Hall and Sargent do not ﬁnd
that surpluses always adjust to rationalize the value of debt. Other evidence, whose causal
interpretation is also in question, suggests that U.S. ﬁscal policy has ﬂuctuated between
regimes in which policies systematically raise future surpluses in response to high debt and
regimes in which surpluses evolve largely independently of debt [Davig and Leeper (2006)].
The ﬁscal stress that advanced economies face is extreme relative to experiences of those
economies since World War II. Given the political economy forces at play, simple extrapola-
tions of past policy behavior into coming decades are tenuous at best. Assuming that ﬁscal
policy will go through periods in which surpluses are set independently of debt or that pri-
vate decision makers believe such periods are possible—even likely—is a reasonable working
assumption. Exogenous surpluses are a tractable way to examine the qualitative nature of
equilibria in which debt is not systematically stabilized by primary surpluses.
11Bohn (1998) is often cited as evidence that establishes this causality, but his methods cannot distinguish
between estimates of a behavioral relation for ﬁscal policy and an equilibrium relation between surpluses
and debt [Li (2011)].
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We take the primary ﬁscal surplus sequence, {τt − zt}, as exogenous and imagine that
information arrives at t that causes agents to revise downward their views about current or
expected surpluses.
The ﬁrst term on the right side of (26) may be written as xt = τt+st−zt. In equilibrium—








Then the second equilibrium condition, (26), becomes
Bt−1(t)+Mt−1
Pt
+ βBt−1(t +1 ) Et
1
Pt+1





For a given debt maturity structure, summarized by the ratio Bt(t+2)/Bt(t+1), monetary
policy behavior determines the mix of current and expected inﬂation that arises from lower
current or anticipated surpluses.
Current Inflation Suppose initially that the central bank pegs the short-bond price at
Qt(t +1 )=Q∗ for all t, eﬀectively pegging expected inﬂation through the Euler equation,
(21). Then (28) becomes
Wt−1
Pt
=  EPV t(x) (29)
where Wt−1 ≡ Bt−1(t)+Mt−1 + Q∗Bt−1(t +1 )a n d EPV t(x) ≡ k + τt − zt +
∞
i=1 βiEtxt+i.
By pegging the bond price, the central bank forces the full adjustment to news about lower
surpluses to occur through increases in the current price level, which revalue the outstanding
nominal government liabilities. For an incremental change in surpluses, d EPV t(x), the




d EPV t(x) (30)
so the rise in the price level is increasing in total nominal government liabilities outstanding
and decreasing in the initial market value of those liabilities.
A higher price level raises nominal money demand. To maintain the pegged bond price at
Q∗, the central bank must expand the nominal money stock by dMt = kdPt,w h i c he n s u r e s
that the money market clears at t. It does this by buying outstanding bonds with newly
issued Mt. With Q∗ pegged, this open-market purchase can occur in either one- or two-
period bonds, to the same eﬀect. As ever, characterizing monetary policy as controlling the
nominal interest rate entails a supporting open-market policy.










The supporting open-market policy is not the textbook case of ΔMt = −ΔBt,i nw h i c h
new money is swapped for bonds, dollar-for-dollar. Instead, given the new equilibrium price
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level from (30) and the associated new equilibrium level of money balances, dMt = kdPt,
the new level of nominal bonds outstanding must be consistent with the government’s ﬂow
budget constraint. Denote the face value of government bonds outstanding at t by Bt ≡
Bt(t +1 )+Q∗Bt(t + 2). In equilibrium, the change in Bt consistent with the government’s











News at t that primary surpluses will be lower in the future raises Pt. To maintain
equilibrium in the money market and allow the short-term bond price to be pegged at Q∗,t h e
central bank passively expands Mt in proportion to the rise in prices. In general, this is not
the end of the policy adjustments because the higher price level that arises from news about
future surpluses leaves the government’s budget out of balance by revaluing outstanding debt
obligations. As (32) makes clear, in equilibrium the face value of government bonds may rise
or fall—more or fewer bonds will be in the hands of the public in period t—as a consequence
of the news of lower future surpluses. If the current (modiﬁed) primary surplus—k+τt−zt—is
positive, the face value of bonds declines; if it’s negative, the face value rises.
The empirical implications of this equilibrium underscore the diﬃculties associated with
drawing causal inferences from the patterns of correlation that a ﬁscal inﬂation produces.
To summarize, news of lower future surpluses creates the following correlations:
• negative correlation between inﬂation and market value of initial government liabilities,
Wt−1/Pt;
• positive correlation between inﬂation and money growth;
• any correlation between nominal debt growth and inﬂation (or money growth);
• higher inﬂation and money growth predicts future ﬁscal deﬁcits, contradicting the
Granger-causality results of King and Plosser (1985).
Evidently, monetary policy behavior—the pegging of short bond prices—plays a central
role in this equilibrium. But that role is not the traditional one of monetizing debt and
there will be no evidence in time series data that inﬂation is being produced by high current
budget deﬁcits or open-market purchases of government bonds, although there will be strong
evidence that inﬂation is proportional to money growth.
Future Inflation By pegging the short-term nominal rate in every period, the central
bank also pegs the long-term (two-period) interest rate. This forces all adjustments to ﬁscal
news into the current price level and leaves expected price levels unchanged. A diﬀerent
monetary policy can force all adjustments into future prices, leaving the current price level
unchanged.
Rewrite equilibrium condition (28)a s
Bt−1(t)+Mt−1
Pt
+ β[Bt−1(t +1 )+Mt]Et
1
Pt+1
=  EPV t(x) (33)
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where  EPV t(x) ≡ (1 + β)k + τt − zt + τt+1 − zt+1 +
∞
i=2 βiEtxt+i.12
We seek an equilibrium in which dPt = 0, implying that dMt =0a l s o . I ns u c ha n











d EPV t(x) (34)
Lower expected primary surpluses produce higher expected inﬂation.
The central bank implements the equilibrium in which lower expected surpluses raise fu-
ture, but not current, prices by adjusting the one-period nominal interest rate appropriately.
First write the equilibrium change in expected prices in (34)i nt e r m so fEt(Pt/Pt+1) and note
that the Euler equation implies that Qt(t+1)=βEt(Pt/Pt+1). Monetary policy pushes into






d EPV t(x) (35)
If the expected present value of surpluses falls, the central bank reduces the price of one-
period bonds, raising the one-period nominal interest rate. That is, monetary policy leans
against expected ﬁscal expansion.
At t + 1, when the higher price level is realized, Mt+1 must rise proportionately. The
equilibrium displays patterns of correlation analogous to those above and conventional em-
pirical approaches to ﬁscal policy and inﬂation will have a diﬃcult time ﬁnding evidence that
ﬁscal expansions are inﬂationary. Inﬂation occurs at t + 1, but surpluses can change at any
t + k,k ≥ 0, so there is no simple Granger-causal ordering between inﬂation and ﬁscal vari-
ables. Data will contain overwhelming support, however, for positive money growth/inﬂation
correlation.
2.5 Regime F: Long-Term Government Debt Inﬂation dynamics become still richer
when we posit that the government issues only consols, a perpetuity that never matures.13











(1 + Qt+1) (37)
Again, the economy has a constant endowment.
Iterate on the ﬂow constraint, (36), impose (37) and the transversality condition, and








jEtxt+j = EPVt(x) (38)
12To obtain (33)w eu s e dβEtst+1 = Et[(Mt+1 − Mt)/Pt+1]=β[k − MtEt(1/Pt+1)].
13This exposition draws on Cochrane (2001, 2011c).
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The intertemporal equilibrium condition implies a convenient expression linking, in equi-










From (37), the price of the consol can be expressed in terms of the entire expected future





















where Rt is the one-period nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank. The asso-
ciated short-term nominal bond is priced as 1/Rt = βEt(Pt/Pt+1).
Using (39), (40)a n d( 41), a given percentage decrease in the expected present value of
surpluses can be apportioned into any mix of current and expected inﬂation rates consistent
with (38)a n d( 40). Substituting (40)i n t o( 38) and denoting the inﬂation rate as πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1
reveals that the expected present value of surpluses determines “total inﬂation,” deﬁned as














Monetary policy behavior determines the precise pattern of expected inﬂation rates through
its setting of current and expected short-term nominal interest rates.14
Consols, though not a realistic maturity structure for government bonds, help to make
clear the range of possible inﬂation processes that a ﬁscal theory equilibrium can produce.
First, inﬂation eﬀects are larger when they are concentrated in only a few periods and smaller
when they are spread over many periods. Second, because only the present value of inﬂation
is pinned down by (38)a n d( 40), news of lower future surpluses can generate any path
of expected inﬂation: it can rise or fall in various periods, so long as the present value of
expected inﬂation adjusts to satisfy (42). Third, because many paths of the surplus are
consistent with a given expected present value, the expected surplus can also rise or fall over
various horizons, as long as the deliver the expected present value.
3 How Fiscal Policy Can Undermine Monetary Control of In-
flation
This section examines situations in which ﬁscal policy can undermine monetary control of
inﬂation. We provide three scenarios in which monetary policy may not be able to target
14Because in this policy regime the equilibrium price level is uniquely determined by (38), together with
equilibrium {Qt}, monetary policy may be treated as setting the sequence of short rates, {Rt}, exogenously
in any pattern desired, without fear of generating indeterminacy of equilibrium.
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Regime 1 Regime 2
t =0 ,1,...,T− 1 t = T,T +1 ,...
Monetary Policy R
−1















Table 2: Monetary-Fiscal Policy Regimes Before and After the Fiscal Limit at Date T
inﬂation. These scenarios are by no means exhaustive, but serve to illustrate the extent to
which monetary and ﬁscal policy must coordinate in order to eﬀectively control the price
level. One example draws on Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010), Leeper (2011), and Leeper
and Walker (2011) and assumes Regime M is operative until a ﬁscal limit is hit at date T.A
ﬁscal limit is the point at which tax rates, either through political or economic constraints,
can no longer adjust to passively raise future tax revenues. A second example introduces
risky sovereign debt to show that a higher probability of default feeds directly into higher
current inﬂation. The third scenario is a two-country monetary union in which one country
follows Regime F with the central bank pegging the nominal interest rate. We demonstrate in
this case that even if the other country implements Regime M, then inﬂation in the monetary
union is determined by the Regime F country, regardless of the country’s size. This analysis
draws on work by Sims (1997), Bergin (2000), Dupor (2000), Daniel (2001) and Daniel and
Shiamptanis (2011).
3.1 Fiscal Limit This section modiﬁes the cashless model in section 2 by assuming the
economy at some known future date T reaches a ﬁscal limit. We starkly model the reluctance
to increase taxes to stabilize debt in the face of growing transfer payments by assuming that
at date T, taxes reach their maximum, τmax.15
Leading up to T, policy is in the active monetary/passive ﬁscal regime described above,
but from date T on, tax policy has no option but to become active, with τt = τmax for t ≥ T.
If monetary policy remained active, neither authority would stabilize debt and debt would
explode. Existence of a bounded equilibrium requires that monetary policy switch to being
passive, which stabilizes debt. Table 2 summarizes the assumptions about policy behavior.
We assume that government transfers evolve exogenously according to the stochastic
process
zt =( 1− ρ)z
∗ + ρzt−1 + εt, 0 <ρ<1 (43)
where z∗ is steady-state transfers and εt is a serially uncorrelated shock with Etεt+1 =0 .












15In this model with lump-sum taxes there is no upper bound for taxes or debt, so long as debt does not
grow faster than the real interest rate. But in a more plausible production economy, in which taxes distort
behavior, there would be a natural ﬁscal limit—the peak of the Laﬀer curve. See Davig, Leeper, and Walker
(2010, 2011) for further discussion and Bi (2011) for an application of an endogenous ﬁscal limit to the issue
of sovereign debt default.
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where the function for the primary surplus, st, changes at the ﬁscal limit according to
st =

τ∗ − γ(Bt−1/Pt−1 − b∗) − zt,t =0 ,1,...,T − 1
τmax − zt,t = T,...,∞
(45)
Expression (44) decomposes the value of government debt at the initial date into the expected
present value of surpluses leading up to the ﬁscal limit and the expected present value of
surpluses after the limit has been hit. Date T is assumed to be known.16






















































Pulling together (46)a n d( 47) yields equilibrium real debt at date t = 0 as a function of





































This expression determines the equilibrium value of debt at t = 0 and, by extension, at
each date in the future. We make three observations. First, this economy will not exhibit
Ricardian equivalence for τmax suﬃciently small and suﬃciently large increases in transfers.
In the derivations above, we set τmax = τ∗, but a suﬃcient condition for our results to go
through is given by τmax <τ ∗ + γ(Bt−1/Pt−1 − b∗) for all realizations of zt. The ﬁscal rule
after T implies that positive innovations to transfers will not be entirely oﬀset by future
changes in tax rates. Only in the absence of the ﬁscal limit or if τmax is suﬃciently large
will Ricardian equivalence hold. This occurs despite the fact that in the absence of a ﬁscal
limit such a tax rule delivers Ricardian equivalence, as it did in section 2.1. Second, higher
transfers at time 0, z0, which portend a higher future path of transfers because of their
16Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010, 2011) and Leeper and Walker (2011) relax this assumption by modeling
T is a random variable. In this case, there are expectational spillover eﬀects which further strengthen the
arguments made in this section.
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positive serial correlation, reduce the value of debt. This occurs for the reasons that section
2.2 lays out: higher expected government expenditures reduce the backing and, therefore,
the value of government liabilities. Finally, how aggressively tax policy responds to debt
before hitting the ﬁscal limit, γ, matters for the value of debt. The Ricardian equivalence
that exists in the permanent active monetary/passive tax regime implies that the timing of
taxation is irrelevant: how rapidly taxes stabilize debt has no bearing on the value of debt
so long as debt is sustainable.
To calculate the price level at t = 0, use the government’s ﬂow budget constraint and the
fact that s0 = τ0 − z0, with taxes following the rule shown in table 2 to solve for P0:
P0 =
R−1B−1
b0 + τ0 − z0
(49)




are solved recursively: having solved for B0/P0 and P0,o b t a i nR0 from the monetary policy
rule in table 2, and derive the nomimal value of debt. Then use (48) redated at t =1t o
obtain equilibrium B1/P1 and the government budget constraint at t =1t os o l v ef o rP1
using (49) redated at t = 1, and so forth.
The equilibrium price level has the same features as it does under the passive mone-
tary/active tax regime in section 2.2. This is because forward-looking agents know that
higher current or expected transfers are not backed in present-value terms by expected taxes.
This, in turn, raises household wealth which increases the demand for goods and drives up
the price level (reducing the value of debt to an equilibrium value). Similarities between
this equilibrium and that in section 2.2 stem from the fact that price-level determination is
driven by beliefs about policy in the long run.F r o mT on, this economy is identical to the
ﬁxed-regime passive monetary/active ﬁscal policies economy and it is beliefs about long-run
policies that determine the price level. Alternatively, one may think of price level determi-
nation in this economy as coming from agents learning about (44), along the lines of Eusepi
and Preston (2011). In such an economy, agents coordinate beliefs on long-run policies and
the equilibrium would be one in which ﬁscal policy is active and monetary policy is passive.
Of course, before the ﬁscal limit the two economies are quite diﬀerent and the behavior of
the price level will also be diﬀerent.
In this environment, monetary policy continues to determine expected inﬂation while
ﬁscal policy determines realizations. Combining (4) with the monetary policy rule in table




















for t ≥ 0. As argued above, the equilibrium price level sequence, {Pt}∞
t=0 is determined by
versions of (48)a n d( 49)f o re a c hd a t et, so (50) describes the evolution of expected inﬂation.
Given equilibrium P0 from (49) and an arbitrary P−1—arbitrary because the economy starts
at t = 0 and cannot possibly determine P−1, regardless of policy behavior—(50)s h o w st h a t
E0(P0/P1) grows relative to the initial inﬂation rate. In fact, throughout the active monetary
policy/passive ﬁscal policy phase, for t =0 ,1,...,T−1, expected inﬂation grows at the rate
αβ−1 > 1. In periods t ≥ T monetary policy pegs the nominal interest rate at R∗, and
expected inﬂation is constant: Et(Pt/Pt+1)=( R∗β)−1 =1 /π∗.
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The implications of the equilibrium laid out in equations (48), (49), and (50) for govern-
ment debt, inﬂation, and the anchoring of expectations on the target values (b∗,π ∗)a r em o s t
clearly seen in a simulation of the equilibrium. Figure 2 contrasts the paths of the debt-GDP
ratio from two models: the ﬁxed (permanent) passive monetary/active tax regime in section
2.2—dashed line—and the present model in which an active monetary/passive tax regime is
in place until the economy hits the ﬁscal limit at date T, when policies switch permanently
to a passive monetary/active tax combination—solid line.17 The ﬁxed regime displays stable
ﬂuctuations of real debt around the 50 percent steady state debt-GDP, which, of course,
the other model also produces once it hits the ﬁscal limit. Leading up to the ﬁscal limit,
however, it is clear that the active monetary/passive tax policy combination does not keep
debt as close to target.
Expected inﬂation evolves according to (50). Since leading up the ﬁscal limit monetary
policy is active, with α>1/β, there is no tendency for expected inﬂation to be anchored on
the inﬂation target. Figure 3 plots the inﬂation rate from the ﬁxed-regime model in section
2.2—dashed line—and from the present model—solid line—along with expected inﬂation
from the present model—dotted dashed line. Inﬂation in the ﬁxed regime ﬂuctuates around
π∗ and, of course, with the pegged nominal interest rate, expected inﬂation is anchored on
target. But in the period leading up to the ﬁscal limit, the price level is being determined
primarily by ﬂuctuations in the real value of debt which, as ﬁgure 2 shows, deviates wildly
from b∗. Expected inﬂation in that period, though not independent of the inﬂation target, is
certainly not anchored by the target. Instead, under active monetary policy, the deviation
of expected inﬂation from target grows with the deviation of actual inﬂation from target in
the previous period. The ﬁgure shows how equation (50) makes expected inﬂation follow
actual inﬂation, with active monetary policy amplifying movements in expected inﬂation.
To underscore the extent to which inﬂation is unhinged from monetary policy, even in
the active monetary/passive tax regime before the ﬁscal limit, suppose that tax policy reacts
more aggressively to debt. Normally, this would return debt to target more rapidly. But
in the presence of a ﬁscal limit, a higher value of γ can have unexpected consequences.
Expression (48) makes clear that raising γ ampliﬁes the eﬀects of transfers shocks on debt.
A more volatile value of debt, in turn, translates into more volatile actual and expected
inﬂation. Figures 4 and 5 show this result by repeating the previous ﬁgures, but with a
passive tax policy that responds more strongly to debt (γ is raised from 0.10 to 0.15).
Figures 4 and 5 also illustrate a general phenomenon: as the economy approaches the
ﬁscal limit at time T, the equilibrium with diﬀerent tax policies converge. As we also see
in ﬁgures 2 and 3, of course, as time approaches T, the equilibrium also converges to the
ﬁxed-regime economy.
An analogous exercise for monetary policy illustrates its impotence when there is a ﬁscal
limit. A more hawkish monetary policy stance, higher α, has no eﬀect whatsoever on the
value of debt and inﬂation: α does not appear in expression (48) for real debt or expression
(49) for the price level. More hawkish monetary policy does, however, amplify the volatility
of expected inﬂation, as the evolution of expected inﬂation, equation (50), shows.
17Figures 2 through 5 use the following calibration. Leading up to the ﬁscal limit, α =1 .50 and γ =0 .10
and at the limit and in the ﬁxed-regime model, α = γ =0 .0. We assume steady state values τ∗ =0 .19,
z∗ =0 .17, π∗ =1 .02 (gross inﬂation rate) and we assume 1/β =1 .04 so that b∗ =0 .50. The transfers
process has ρ =0 .90 and σ =0 .003. Identical realizations of transfers were used in all the ﬁgures.
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Figure 2: Debt-GDP ratios for a realization of transfers for two models: ﬁxed passive mon-
etary/active tax regime in section 2.2—dashed line—and model in which an active mone-
tary/passive tax regime is in place until the economy hits the ﬁscal limit at date T,w h e n
policies switch permanently to passive monetary/active tax—solid line.
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Figure 3: Inﬂation for a realization of transfers for two models: ﬁxed passive monetary/active
tax regime in section 2.2—dashed line—and model in which an active monetary/passive tax
regime is in place until the economy hits the ﬁscal limit at date T, when policies switch
permanently to passive monetary/active tax—solid line; expectation of inﬂation from present
model—dotted dashed line.
23Leeper & Walker: Perceptions and Misperceptions of Fiscal Inflation























Debt in Fixed Regime F
Passive Monetary/
Active Fiscal





Figure 4: Debt-GDP ratios for two settings of tax policy: ﬁxed passive monetary/active
ﬁscal regime in section 2.2—dashed line—the active monetary/passive ﬁscal regime before
the ﬁscal limit at date T with weaker response of taxes to debt (γ =0 .10)—solid line—the
active monetary/passive ﬁscal regime before the ﬁscal limit at date T with stronger response
of taxes to debt (γ =0 .15)—dotted dashed line.
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Figure 5: Inﬂation for two settings of tax policy: actual inﬂation in ﬁxed passive mone-
tary/active ﬁscal regime in section 2.2—dashed line—expected inﬂation in the active mone-
tary/passive ﬁscal regime before the ﬁscal limit at date T with weaker response of taxes to
debt (γ =0 .10)—solid line—expected inﬂation in the active monetary/passive ﬁscal regime
before the ﬁscal limit at date T with stronger response of taxes to debt (γ =0 .15)—dotted
dashed line.
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Because monetary policy loses control of inﬂation after the ﬁscal limit is reached, forward-
looking behavior implies it also loses control of inﬂation before the ﬁscal limit is hit. By
extension, changes in ﬁscal behavior in the period leading up to the limit aﬀect both the
equilibrium inﬂation process and the process for expected inﬂation.
3.2 Risky Sovereign Debt and Inflation Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2010) explore how
the possibility of sovereign debt default can further complicate the central bank’s eﬀorts to
control inﬂation. Here we show this basic result in a simple example.
Consider a constant endowment, cashless economy in which the equilibrium real interest
rate, 1/β, is also constant. Government default is the sole source of uncertainty and, for the
current purposes, the decision to default by the fraction δt ∈ [0,1] on outstanding debt is
exogenous and follows a known stochastic process. Let Rt be the gross risky rate of return
on nominal government debt and πt = Pt/Pt−1 be the inﬂation rate. Household optimization









while trade in risk-free bonds (assumed to be in zero net supply) gives an analogous relation























where st is the primary surplus. Write this constraint at t+1, take expectations conditional








When the real interest rate is ﬁxed, both the nominal rate and the inﬂation rate reﬂect
default, so that the expected default rate drops out once expectations are taken. This
implies that only surprises in default directly aﬀect the evolution of real government debt in
this ﬂexible-price endowment economy. In light of this, we obtain, by iterating on (54)a n d








Expression (55) is the usual intertemporal equilibrium condition that equates the value of
government debt to the expected present value of “cash ﬂows,” which are primary surpluses.
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where s∗ and b∗ are target and steady state values for the surplus and real debt and bt−1 =
Bt−1/Pt−1.





−1 − γ(1 − Etδt+1)]bt (57)
One result that emerges immediately from (57) is that stability of the debt process in the





a condition that potentially is far more demanding than the usual one that γ>β −1 − 1,
particularly when substantial default rates are possible. Here stability also has the un-
usual property of being time varying, changing with the conditional expectation of default.
Provided this condition is fulﬁlled, however, ﬁscal policy remains passive and capable of
stabilizing the real value of government debt.
Following Uribe (2006) and Schabert (2010), we assume that monetary policy sets the















Monetary policy targets inﬂation by setting α/β > 1. Aside from being the dominant rule
in the literature, in the context of our cashless model it is natural for monetary policy to
be implemented by varying the contractual interest rate on government debt, rather than
the risk-free interest rate on private debt, over which the government has no direct control
and which is in zero net supply in equilibrium. More generally, in the transmission from
the very short-term rates targeted through open-market operations to the wider economy
and, ultimately inﬂation, the central bank would expect to see a signiﬁcant degree of pass
through to the contractual interest rates employed throughout the economy.18 Indeed, since
government bonds typically form the collateral for the repo contracts undertaken by central
banks, it is inevitable that without an oﬀsetting policy adjustment, the policy rates pick up
some of the default risk.19
When monetary policy controls the risky interest rate, Rt, default inﬂuences the ability of
the monetary authority to target inﬂation, even if ﬁscal policy remains passive and monetary
policy is active. To see this, combine the monetary policy rule in (59) with the Fisher relation

















18Empirical evidence suggests that the rate at which policy interest rates pass through to bank interest
rates is quite high—about 90 percent within a quarter [Gambacorta (2008)]. We are implicitly assuming
similarly high rates of pass through to government bond yields.
19Sims (2008) emphasizes that the unconventional operations of many central banks—particularly the Fed
and the ECB—in recent years have made the central banks’ balance sheets riskier. If foreign reserves are an
important component of the bank’s assets, as for the ECB, then surprise appreciation of the euro devalues
its assets relative to its liabilities. The Fed’s increased holdings of long-term Treasuries expose its balance
sheet to more interest-rate risk than normal. Riskiness is exacerbated if the central bank is not assured that
the ﬁscal authority will back it in times of large declines in asset values.
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which now depends on the expected default rate.






















In the absence of default, δt ≡ 0, monetary policy achieves its inﬂation target exactly,
πt = π∗. Higher expected default rates in the future raise current inﬂation. The farther into
the future default is expected, the more it is discounted by β/α < 1, and the smaller is its
impact on inﬂation at time t. Notice also that if the default rate is constant, δt ≡ δ ∈ [0,1],
then more aggressive monetary policy enhances the central bank’s control of inﬂation. A












so that πt → π∗ as α →∞ . A more aggressive monetary policy response to inﬂation reduces
the inﬂationary consequences of default. Importantly, the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy
is conditional on ﬁscal policy behaving passively.
Finally, consider a stylized experiment. At time t news arrives that raises the expected
default rate at t+1,Etδt+1 > 0, but all subsequent expected default rates are zero, Etδt+j =0











and again we see that higher expected default raises inﬂation, but the extent to which it
does so is mitigated by a more aggressive monetary response to inﬂation in the form of a
higher α.
The source of this inﬂationary response to default can be seen in contrasting the interest
rate rules when deﬁned in terms of risky and risk-free interest rates. A risk-free rule, coupled
with a passive ﬁscal policy, can successfully target inﬂation. To see why the rule deﬁned in
terms of the risky-rate cannot, it is helpful to return to the simple case where the default



























The monetary policy rule deﬁned in terms of the risky rate of interest can be transformed
into a rule of the same form as that deﬁned in terms of the risk-free rate, but with two
important diﬀerences. First, default does not make monetary policy less active; in fact, it
raises the coeﬃcient on excess inﬂation, α
1−δ >α . Second, default raises the eﬀective inﬂation
target from π∗ to
π∗
1−δβ/α. Intuitively, a higher rate of default creates partial monetary policy
accommodation: in the presence of default, the monetary authority must allow the risky
rate of interest to rise to induce bondholders to continue holding the stock of government
bonds. Given the monetary policy rule, the monetary authority will not raise interest rates
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without a rise in inﬂation. Bondholders attempt to sell bonds, increasing aggregate demand
as they try to increase their consumption paths. This behavior pushes up the price level until
bondholders are being compensated for their default risk and inﬂation and interest rates are
consistent with the monetary rule. Stronger responsiveness of policy to inﬂation, higher α,
reduces the eﬀective rise in the inﬂation target needed to achieve the rise in interest rates
desired by bondholders.20
As a general proposition, the possibility of default can undermine the central bank’s con-
trol of inﬂation: there is a tight connection between expected default rates and inﬂation, as
in Uribe (2006), but the mechanism diﬀers from Uribe’s. Uribe obtains his result through
a standard ﬁscal theory of the price level mechanism by coupling an active monetary policy
rule like (59) with an active ﬁscal rule akin to setting γ = 0 in (56), just as in Loyo (1999)
and, more recently, Sims (2011). Such analyses echo the logic of Sargent and Wallace’s
(1981) unpleasant arithmetic, where the ﬁscal consequences of a tight monetary policy can
ultimately generate higher inﬂation because ﬁscal policy does not adjust to stabilize gov-
ernment debt. In contrast, the present result stems from the monetary policy response to
default, but where the policy rule remains active and ﬁscal policy passive. Although there is
a positive link between default and inﬂation, that link diﬀers from existing results in crucial
ways. For example, in Uribe (2006) delaying default supports unstable inﬂation dynamics
for longer, making it more diﬃcult for the monetary authority to hit its inﬂation target. In
this active monetary/passive ﬁscal regime, though, the impact of future default on prices
is discounted so that delaying default reduces the immediate inﬂationary consequences of
default. In Uribe’s setup, raising α further destabilizes inﬂation dynamics and moves the
economy farther from its inﬂation target. More active monetary policy in Bi, Leeper and
Leith’s (2010) environment reduces deviations from the inﬂation target due to default.
3.3 Monetary Union The example in section 3.1 shows that the inability of policy
makers to commit to a particular policy stance in the future has repercussions today. We
now provide an example of an economy in which ﬁscal authorities in two countries in a
monetary union are unable (or unwilling) to commit to passive ﬁscal behavior. It turns out
that it takes only one country to deviate in order for the ﬁscal theory of the price level to
emerge in the monetary union. The exposition simpliﬁes the setup in Bergin (2000).
Consider two symmetric countries in a monetary union. One simpliﬁcation of Bergin is
to consider a cashless economy and another is to assume a constant world endowment of














Countries retain ﬁscal sovereignty in the sense that they set taxes, τj,t, and transfers, zj,t,
independently. But there is a common price level, Pt, and a common one-period nominal
20As Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2010) note, monetary policy can regain its control of inﬂation through a policy
rule that allows the central bank to react directly to the possibility of default, but such a rule is anathema
to many central bankers.
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interest rate, Rt, across the economies. A common price level implicitly assumes that all
goods are traded and purchasing power parity holds. Below we describe how the single
central bank sets Rt each period.
Country j’s government chooses policies to satisfy the ﬂow budget constraint
Dj,t
Pt




where vj,t is lump-sum transfers received from the common central bank.
The central bank buys and sells bonds, Bm,t, to implement its interest rate policies. The
bank does not levy taxes or issue debt. Interest earnings from its portfolio holdings, v1,t
























Goods and bond market clearing conditions are
c1,t + c2,t = y1,t + y2,t = y
B1,t + B2,t + Bm,t = D1,t + D2,t
Although not strictly necessary for an equilibrium, we follow Sims (1997) and Bergin
(2000) in imposing that each individual government must choose policies that are consistent
with individual solvency.21
Assume that preferences are quadratic, as in Bergin (2000): u(cj,t)=cj,t − a
2c2
j,t for each
j =1 ,2. Then with a constant worldwide endowment of goods, adding the Euler equations







and applying (68)t oe a c hj, country-speciﬁc consumptions are random walks
c1,t = Etc1,t+1
c2,t = Etc2,t+1
21Woodford (1998b) observes that private optimizing behavior imposes only that the sum D1,t + D2,t
would satisfy transversality. In this case, debt issued by one country can grow exponentially as long as the
other country is willing to buy that debt without limit and without any expectation of being repaid. Sims
(1997) points out that any eﬀort to rationalize government policies would lead immediately to transversality
conditions for Dj,t individually: it would not be politically optimal for a country to extend unlimited loans
to another member country. An analogous argument applies to rule out overaccumulation of debt by the
central bank.
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Imposing equilibrium, the Fisher relation, and government ﬂow budget constraints on














jEt [τ2,t+j + v2,t+j − z2,t+j] (72)








jEt [v1,t+j + v2,t+j] (73)
Consider a mix of monetary and ﬁscal policies in which the central bank pegs the nominal
interest rate at Rt = R∗ for all t, while country 1 sets the primary surplus, x1,t = {τ1,t−z1,t},
exogenously and country 2 makes its primary surplus, x2,t, strongly responsive to the state













2 is the steady state primary surplus and b∗
2 is the steady state value of government
debt in country 2. By setting γ>1/β − 1, the government in country 2 adjusts future
surpluses in response to deviations of debt from b∗
2 by enough to retire debt back to steady
state.
Two results immediately emerge. First, if {x1,t} is exogenous and rebates from the central
bank to the government, {v1,t}, are independent of the state of government debt in country
1, then the worldwide price level, Pt, is determined by equilibrium condition (71). At time
t, Rt−1D1,t−1 is predetermined and the expected present value of primary surpluses plus
rebates are independent of Pt, so the price level must adjust to ensure that (71)h o l d s .N e w s
of lower taxes or rebates or of higher transfers payments, reduces the value of country 1’s
debt, inducing agents in country 1 to substitute out of bonds and into consumption goods.
This higher demand for goods raises the price level until agents are content to buy their
initial consumption baskets.
In turn, a higher price level reduces the value of country 2’s debt and, via the surplus rule
in (74), reduces expected surpluses in that country. Thus, ﬁscal disturbances in country 1
spill over to country 2 through general equilibrium eﬀects on the price level. The quantitative
importance of these spillover eﬀects depend upon the size of the tax cut or transfer payment
in country 1.22
Second, if the central bank determines rebates to member countries as a function of each
country’s ﬁscal stance—the value of outstanding debt—then (71) no longer imposes any
restrictions on the equilibrium price level, even if country 1 continues to maintain exogenous
primary surpluses. To uniquely determine the price level, the central bank must shift from
22In this setting, where all goods are traded, the size of country 1 does not matter: Greece can determine
euro-wide price levels. Incorporating non-traded goods and distinguishing among country-speciﬁc and euro-
wide price levels attenuates this stark and implausible result.
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pegging the nominal interest rate to targeting the inﬂation rate. It can do this by setting














where π∗ is the inﬂation target and α>1/β to ensure a unique, stable inﬂation process.
Although this policy mix delivers a unique bounded equilibrium, it carries an important
distributional message. Eﬀorts by the central bank to reduce inﬂation will translate into
higher values of debt in each country—conditions (71)a n d( 72). Country 2, which is following
the surplus rule in (74), will need to raise future surpluses. Country 1, which continues to
set primary surpluses exogenously, now requires a relatively larger rebate from the central
bank. As condition (73) makes clear, a higher rebate to country 1 may require a lower rebate
to county 2, forcing country 2 to raise taxes or cut transfer payments still further.23
4 Empirical Aspects of Policy Interactions
Given the diﬀerences in the equilibria described above, it might seem straightforward to dis-
tinguish an equilibrium time series generated by active monetary/passive ﬁscal policies from
a time series generated by passive monetary/active ﬁscal policy. Unfortunately, subtle ob-
servational equivalence results may make it diﬃcult to identify which regime is “active” and
which regime is “passive.” In this section we highlight two identiﬁcation challenges—one in
which observational equivalence exists between determinant and indeterminant equilibrium,
which follows Cochrane (2011a), and another that demonstrates the challenges in distin-
guishing between regimes M and F from empirical observation. We view these results as
provocative but only suggestive—further study is needed to determine whether the results
generalize to more sophisticated setups. One implication ﬂows even from the simple experi-
ments conducted here: empirically testing for the interactions between monetary and ﬁscal
policy by examining simple correlations in the data will lead to spurious results and poten-
tially false conclusions. This suggests that existing eﬀorts to “test” for the ﬁscal theory may
be more challenging than originally believed [Bohn (1998), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2001), Cochrane (1998, 2005), Woodford (1998a, 2001), Leeper (1991), Sims (2011)].
4.1 Indeterminacy and Observational Equivalence There is a straightforward
observational equivalence due to Cochrane (2010, 2011a) in which indeterminant equilibria
can generate time series that are indistinguishable (same covariance generating process) from
determinant ones.
To show this result, consider the simple model consisting of a Fisher relation and mone-
tary policy rule
Rt = r + Etπt+1
Rt = r + απt + xt
xt = b(L)εx,t
23Implicit in the equilibrium condition pertaining to the central bank’s liabilities, (73), is the notion that
if transfers to country 2 are unbounded above, then transfers (taxes) to country 1 must be unbounded below.
This underscores that there may be limits to the ability of the central bank to retain control of inﬂation if
one member of the union pursues an active ﬁscal policy.
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where Rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is inﬂation, and r is the constant real rate. The
only restriction we impose on the stochastic process for the monetary policy disturbance,
xt, is square summability,

j b2
j < ∞. The following proposition shows that there exists a
stochastic process for the monetary policy rule that generates an observational equivalence
between the determinant and indeterminant equilibria.
Proposition 1. (Cochrane) For any stationary time series process for {Rt,π t} that solves
Etπt+1 = απt + xt (76)
and for any α, one can construct an xt process that generates the same process for the
observables {Rt,π t} as a solution to (76) using the alternative α.I fα>1, the observables
are generated as the unique bounded forward-looking solution. Given an assumed α and the
process πt = a(L)εx,t,w h e r ea(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L,w ec a nc o n s t r u c t
xt = b(L)εx,t with
bj = aj+1 − αaj
or
b(L)=( L
−1 − α)a(L) − a(0)L
−1 (77)







εx,t = a(L)εx,t (78)
For α<1, the equilibrium will not be uniquely determined and one may construct a πt solved
“backward” to obtain, πt = xt/(1 − αL). Specifying b(L)a s( 77) and substituting into (78)
gives πt = xt/(1 − αL). Under this restriction, the inﬂation process generated by α<1 will
be identical to the inﬂation process generated by α>1. Proving the converse (starting with
α<1 and showing that there exists an α>1 that generates the observational equivalence)
is straightforward since one can always write the solution as πt+1 = απt + xt + δt+1,w h e r e
δt+1 is an arbitrary shock. In this case, setting δt+1 = a0εt+1 delivers the result. Note that
because Rt = r + Etπt+1, matching the inﬂation process also delivers an equivalence in the
nominal interest rate.
The proposition illustrates that important identifying restrictions are imposed on the
model through the speciﬁcation of the exogenous processes. The cross-equation restrictions
of (78) make clear the tight relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables. As
Cochrane (2011a) emphasizes, for an exogenous process given by (77), it is impossible to tell
if observed time series are generated by a determinant or an indeterminate equilibrium.
Proposition 1 relies on the indeterminant equilibria taking a very particular form. But
by deﬁnition, there are an inﬁnite number of indeterminant equilibria. We now show that
a type of observational equivalence, similar in spirit to proposition 1, applies for unique
equilibria that emerge from models with decoupled determinacy regions. The two regimes
described in section 2, for example, arise from decoupled determinacy regions, as do many
of the linear rational expectation models that researchers and policy institutions use to
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study monetary-ﬁscal interactions. Examining the dynamic properties of the two equilibria
for general exogenous processes delivers an equivalence between the two unique rational
expectations equilibria, which we believe is a more provocative ﬁnding than proposition 1.
This section establishes that observational equivalence results can emerge when exam-
ining ﬁscal and monetary interactions. Our example is a trivial one and we do not provide
a rigorous treatment of the issues here; a careful treatment would require more than a few
pages and is beyond the scope of the current paper. But even this simple demonstration is
suﬃcient to signal a note of caution when examining the empirical aspects of monetary-ﬁscal
interactions.










for t ≥ 0, where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 and bt ≡ Bt/Pt. As in section 2,w ee x a m i n et h et w op o l i c y
regimes (Regime M and Regime F), deﬁned in terms of the monetary and ﬁscal parameters,
(α,γ).
The log-linearized equilibrium equations are given by
ˆ Rt =ˆ πt+1 (81)
ˆ bt +( β
−1 − 1)ˆ st = β
−1ˆ bt−1 + β
−1( ˆ Rt−1 − ˆ πt) (82)
where ˆ xt ≡ ln(xt) − ln(x∗) and we have used that in steady state, s/b = β−1 − 1. These
equations hold for t ≥ 0, given R−1b−1 > 0.
Substituting the linearized policy rules, (79)a n d( 80), into (81)a n d( 82) reduces the
system to
ˆ πt+1 = αˆ πt,t ≥ 0 (83)
ˆ bt + β
−1ˆ πt = γ
∗ˆ bt−1 + αβ
−1ˆ πt−1,t ≥ 1 (84)
ˆ b0 +( β
−1 − 1)ˆ s0 = β
−1(ˆ b−1 + ˆ R−1) (85)
where γ∗ ≡ β−1 − γ(β−1 − 1).
For ease of exposition, we consider the special case in which R−1B−1 is at its steady state
value, so ˆ b−1 = ˆ R−1 =0 . 24
Consider Regime M in which α>1a n dγ>1 (implying that 0 <γ ∗ < 1). There is a
unique bounded equilibrium of a trivial form
ˆ πt =0 , ˆ Rt =0 , ˆ bt =0 , ˆ st =0 , for all t ≥ 0 (86)
24If instead R−1B−1 > 0, the results that follow continue to hold, but in modiﬁed form. Regime M
and Regime F equilibria can still be observationally equivalent—delivering identical equilibrium paths for
{ ˆ Rt, ˆ πt,ˆ bt, ˆ st} for t ≥ 0 but under diﬀerent ﬁscal rules from the ones considered here. Diﬀerences come from
the fact that, although ˆ Rt =ˆ πt =0 ,t ≥ 0 continues to hold, the present value of surpluses must equal
initial debt, ˆ b−1 + ˆ R−1. Regime M implements this by setting γ>1, while Regime F implements this with
an exogenous process for {ˆ st}. Given time paths for equilibrium { ˆ Rt, ˆ πt, ˆ st}, the equilibrium debt sequence
comes from (82).
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We can implement the equilibrium in (86) by adopting the passive monetary and active
ﬁscal policy rules
ˆ Rt = 0 (87)
ˆ st = 0 (88)
for t ≥ 0. These rules emerge when α = γ =0 .
These policy rules can deliver the remaining aspects of the Regime M equilibrium in (86).
ˆ Rt =0 ,t≥ 0 and a constant real interest rate imply that ˆ πt+j =0f o rj ≥ 1. ˆ Rt =0a n d
ˆ st =0 ,t ≥ 0, imply that (because γ =0 ,γ∗ = β−1) in equilibrium the law of motion for
debt is
ˆ bt = β
−1ˆ bt−1 − β
−1ˆ πt (89)





jˆ πt+j = 0 (90)
But if ˆ bt =0 ,t h e n( 89) implies that ˆ πt = 0, delivering precisely the equilibrium in (86).
Constant primary surpluses and pegged nominal interest rates imply that future ﬁnancing
of debt is constant, which ﬁxes the value of debt.
This derivation shows that when the equilibrium real interest rate is constant, the unique
bounded equilibrium produced by Regime M can be exactly reproduced by Regime F.
These results are merely suggestive of problems that lurk in the endeavor to identify
whether observed time series are produced by Regime M or Regime F. One can easily con-
struct monetary models in which determinacy regions are not decoupled (and ignoring ﬁscal
policy altogether is not a viable way of achieving decoupling, in our view). For example, a
Blanchard (1985)–Yaari (1965) model with a probability of death, can generate wealth ef-
fects that modify the determinacy regions suﬃciently that it is no longer tenable to maintain
the distinctions between monetary and ﬁscal policy [Richter (2011)]. Yun (2011) develops
a number of mechanisms—learning, sovereign risk, ﬁnancial frictions, and alternative roles
for government debt—that break the decoupling by introducing debt directly into the con-
sumption Euler equation. It is also not clear if these identiﬁcation problems extend to more
general setups. The more sophisticated the model and policy rule, the greater the likelihood
that the identiﬁcation problems discussed here become less severe.
Scant attention has been paid to these identiﬁcation issues in the literature [but see
Cochrane (2011a) and Sims (2011) for exceptions]. Many authors have attempted to discern
whether equilibrium data were generated by Regime M or Regime F. Many of these attempts
use reduced-form models in which policy behavior is not identiﬁed, relying instead on the
restrictions imposed by the government’s intertemporal ﬁnancing constraint to identify policy
regimes. These eﬀorts cannot work: the government’s budget constraint and the associated
intertemporal equilibrium condition must be satisﬁed in any equilibrium, regardless of the
underlying policy regimes.
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5 Concluding Remarks
An argument that holds substantial currency among economists and policy makers is that
central bankers learned the lessons of past periods of high inﬂation that, for example, Fis-
cher, Sahay, and V´ egh (2002) document. First, too-rapid money growth generates inﬂation.
Second, operationally separating the central bank from the ﬁscal authority ensures that the
ﬁnance ministry cannot require the central bank to provide any speciﬁc cash ﬂows or seignior-
age revenues. The understanding of the connection between money growth and inﬂation,
coupled with the operational independence of the central bank, the argument goes, permits
the monetary authorities today to achieve their policy objectives.
This argument builds on Friedman’s (1970) aphorism that “inﬂation is always and every-
where a monetary phenomenon” and it makes an implicit and essential assumption: ﬁscal
policy will always behave in the “appropriate” manner. Sims (1999, p. 424) deﬁnes “appro-
priate” ﬁscal behavior in his description of central bank independence: “A truly independent
central bank is one that can act, even under inﬂationary or deﬂationary stress, without any
worry about whether the necessary ﬁscal backing for its actions will be forthcoming.” That
is, if in pursuit of its objectives a central bank were to encounter balance sheet diﬃculties,
an independent bank would be automatically recapitalized by the ﬁscal authority.
Sims’s point connects to Wallace’s (1981) Modigliani-Miller theorem for open-market
operations: the impacts of central bank asset swaps depend on ﬁscal policy behavior. In
Wallace’s paper, open-market sales of bonds have no eﬀects on equilibrium allocations and
prices. Under alternative assumptions on ﬁscal behavior, such monetary contractions may
reduce inﬂation, while under Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) assumptions, the contractions
raise inﬂation.
The theory presented above introduces an additional dimension to the monetary-ﬁscal
interactions that Wallace considers: the channel for price-level determination that operates
through nominally denominated outstanding government debt and expected future primary
ﬁscal surpluses. Because this channel is more subtle than Sargent and Wallace’s monetization
mechanism, ﬁscal policy can aﬀect inﬂation even if an operationally independent central bank
dutifully avoids printing new ﬁat money to cover ﬁscal budget shortfalls.
Policy makers need a broad understanding of the factors that determine inﬂation. The
conventional view, what we call Regime M, proposes that monetary policy can control in-
ﬂation. A requirement of this view is that ﬁscal policy must reliably adjust surpluses to
ensure that government debt is stable. When governments issue nominal debt, an alter-
native mix of policies—Regime F—reverses the roles of the two macro policies, with ﬁscal
policy determining inﬂation and monetary policy stabilizing debt.
If current and projected ﬁscal stress in advanced economies continues unresolved, eco-
nomic agents will grow more uncertain that the ﬁscal adjustments that Regime M requires
will occur. And central bank behavior in recent years has shown people that monetary policy
does not always aggressively lean against inﬂation—at times, other concerns are paramount.
As beliefs become increasingly centered on Regime F, monetary policy loses its ability to
control inﬂation and inﬂuence economic activity in the usual ways. Because these develop-
ments are driven primarily by ﬁscal behavior, there is little that independent central bankers
can do to anchor expectations on Regime M policies.
Regimes M and F produce equilibria in which monetary and ﬁscal disturbances have very
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diﬀerent eﬀects on macroeconomic time series. Despite these diﬀerences, we have shown that
it can be diﬃcult to determine which regime generated observed data.
This conclusion may seem iconoclastic or even depressing. But if observational equiva-
lence extends to more general classes of models, such as those that policy institutions employ,
then it points toward two constructive conclusions for policy modeling. First, policy model-
ers could adopt more general driving processes and be aware that they achieve identiﬁcation
through arbitrary assumptions about unobservables. Second, to the extent that simple ad
hoc speciﬁcations of policy rules are integral to interpretations of data, these speciﬁcations
can be varied to admit more general interpretations.
There is also a message in these results for policy makers themselves. Because two very
diﬀerent understandings of the inﬂation process can be equally consistent with observed
data, it is prudent to broaden the perspective on inﬂation determination beyond the single,
conventional view that dominates policy thinking.
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